Afghanistan's historic vote will create an elected parliament for the first time since 1973. Yet when the dust settles, Sunday's vote may be remembered less for what it put in place than what it ended. The vote marks the end of the international mandate (embodied in the 2001 Bonn Accord)—and finds Afghanistan at perhaps its most perilous juncture since the liberation of Kabul.

Although it has achieved numerous gains, Afghanistan is still a long way from success. Negotiations for a new international framework ("Bonn II") come at a when the most achievable goals have been realized and the most daunting problems—the opium economy and internal insecurity—threaten to unravel all previous progress. These two problems are interrelated, and become particularly troubling with the country awash in arms and poised on a geopolitical fault line. No one has yet proposed plans on these issues that inspire confidence.

Yet unless the international community and the Afghan government create a framework that addresses these problems, the institutions built over the past four years could fold like a house of cards. These solutions must be found quickly, as the country races to achieve some self-sufficiency before donor fatigue sets in.

A central problem is that foreign donors have raised Afghan expectations without creating the means for Afghans to fulfill them. Donors have attempted to erect a centralized modern state atop a tribal society which resembles, in terms of income and health indicators, only the poorest states of sub-Saharan Africa.

With the United States in the lead, for example, Afghanistan will train and equip a professional 70,000 man force which would require expenditures equal to an unsustainable 17 percent of Afghanistan's entire GDP every year. Is this the force Afghanistan needs? Its size is more than sufficient to deter any plausible threat from Afghanistan's neighbors. On the other hand, it is unlikely to solve the Taliban insurgency, a task that has eluded the most advanced and mobile force in history. And in terms of resolving the warlord issue and ensuring internal stability, the army's composition raises as many questions as it answers. Creating a fiscally unsustainable army in a land of warlords and drug barons would be a recipe for disaster.

Despite an impressive increase over last year's efforts, Afghanistan currently collects taxes on a meager 5 percent of the country's legal GDP. Even if Afghan government revenues increased sixfold, it could not afford the relatively expensive institutions, suitable to a middle-income developing country, that donors have set in motion. The armed forces, police, and constitutionally-mandated election process are even more expensive still. So far, foreign donors have footed the bill, but history suggests that donors won't continue to pay these normal domestic operating expenses indefinitely.

The troubling reality is that Afghanistan's economy is afloat on a capital flow from two faucets: foreign aid and drugs. Foreign assistance disbursements since 2001 have totaled $3.7 billion—a sum that is barely half the income from the drug economy during the same period. The per capita foreign commitment to Afghanistan has been dramatically below that of other nation building efforts in Iraq, the Balkans, East Timor and Haiti (see chart). The United States has chosen to spend the lion's share of its financial investment (approximately $10 billion per year) in Afghanistan on military operations.

Source: Dobbins, James, et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, RAND, 2005, p.239

Meanwhile, last year illegal narcotics revenues totaled more than half of Afghanistan's GDP from legitimate sources and flow more and more toward traffickers rather than farmers. And while aid money may already be starting to dry up, inflows from drugs will remain strong for the foreseeable future. Those who control the money flows from narcotics and smuggling seem certain to control the future of Afghanistan.

Karzai has responded to internal and external security threats by relying on a strong U.S. military presence to ensure his security. Yet that very presence undermines his position with neighboring states. The U.S.-Afghan strategic agreement, signed in May, permits the Pentagon free operations and basing for the indefinite future, an arrangement that has stirred alarm among Afghanistan's neighbors. Iran responded by doubling export tariffs on concrete, slowing Herat's booming construction industry to a crawl. China and Russia responded by conducting joint military exercises and urging the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which also includes Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) to call for a timeline for U.S. withdrawal.

What should Bonn II look like?

The Bonn Accord has served Afghanistan well, but the next agreement, which donor states and the Afghan government will negotiate in late January, must revitalize and rethink international engagement.

So far, foreign donors have not succeeded in helping Afghanistan develop the capacity to provide for its own people. A central issue for shared international commitment in the years ahead—"Bonn II"—will be supporting the Afghan National Development Strategy that Kabul is developing. Donors acknowledge the importance of capacity building, but, with the goal of increasing efficiency, have chosen to circumvent the Afghan government and local initiatives. The vast majority of funds are routed through U.S.-based contractors, a practice that undermines the credibility of the Afghan government and leaves much of the money with middle men.

Is there a solution for providing aid better? Two trust funds have been established that provide a better approach: the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), managed by the World Bank, and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which is run by UNDP. Both these funds promote Afghan ownership, accountability, and equitable distribution. Currently the United States does not contribute to either.

Bonn II must also address regional issues. Iran, Pakistan, China, and Russia must all be engaged in the process. The United States, in conjunction with this framework, should declare that it does not plan to remain indefinitely in Afghanistan and announce a strategy for withdrawal. Permanent U.S. bases would inflame Afghanistan's neighbors and undermine the prospects for a common international framework, as well as foment growing resistance among the local population, which has only tolerated foreign troops so far because the short-term alternatives seem worse.

Finally, Bonn II must rethink the current approach to narcotics. There are no easy solutions to a problem that has become inseparable from the country's economic well being, and indispensable to its power holders, but it's clear that even a robust program of eradication will not succeed in the current environment. There are some creative solutions, such as the Senlis Council's proposal to license some of Afghanistan's narcotics for use as painkillers, which deserve attention.

It's not uncommon to hear people say "We need to do for Iraq what we did for Afghanistan." Certainly the international solidarity to date on Afghanistan makes it seem that, compared to Iraq, Afghanistan is on track for success, but this is hardly the case on the ground. Beneath that surface success is a more complicated—and very tenuous—reality. With a critical decision point approaching in January, the United States must be willing to revitalize its commitments and rethink its approach.

Carl Robichaud is a program officer at The Century Foundation. Visit Afghanistan Watch for more news, statistics, and analysis on Afghanistan.