Building bureaucracies is not sexy. It lacks the bricks-and-mortar utility of highway and bridge construction or the testosterone-tinged appeal of putting uniformed soldiers and cops on the street. But creating a bureaucratic infrastructure is one of the most urgent and critical steps Afghanistan can take toward preventing the recurrence of civil strife.

At least that's the premise of the Afghan Stabilisation Programme (ASP), a multi-donor $312 million dollar investment to rebuild the country's bureaucratic infrastructure, which kicks off this week. The money—a sizable chunk considering Afghan aid budgets—will mostly be spent on rehabilitating district offices, which provide the only direct interaction with government for most Afghans. As the deputy Interior Minister noted this week, "only a proper local administration can bring stability and build people's trust in the government."

Right now trust is low. According to the best available public opinion data, collected in April by The Asia Society, Afghans were generally satisfied with their current government but felt "extremely disconnected from their leaders":

Almost six citizens in ten (58%) did not feel the government cares about what people like them think and another 30% did not know. A mere 11% said the government does care about what they think—an extremely low percentage. Those regions reporting the greatest political alienation are the Northeast (where 71% say government doesn't care), Northwest (74%) and Central East/Kabul (76%). (From page 65 of the Full Report)

What accounts for this level of alienation? District offices are staffed by local power holders (or their agents) who have little capacity or interest in providing services such as education or clean water. Often, local 'officials' receive people in their own houses and their power is based upon personal stature rather than their function as a government representative. Their relationship with the national government is weak, and at times antagonistic. And with more than half of Afghanistan's GDP generated by drugs and smuggling, these functionaries often derive their income from illicit means and their power from armed loyalists.

The government of Afghanistan faces the unenviable task of replacing this system of personal patronage with a bureaucratic system based on what Max Weber termed the 'rational-legal' claim to authority, in which merit is rewarded, practices are routinized, and leaders scrutinized and held accountable. The ASP plays a key role, as it will provide training for civil servants and construct standard public facilities for government departments, post offices, and banks. The fund would also provide a communications infrastructure, as well as vehicles for administrators and housing for senior civil servants stationed in the hinterland. The ASP relies on the premise that infrastructure and inducements will make it possible for districts to attract qualified administrators, and to supplant district bosses—who typically lack competency, loyalty, or both—with more effective and responsive leaders.

This is a tall order. Administrative facilities, if they exist at all, are decrepit, and communications remain unreliable. Afghanistan cannot take for granted any of the technologies or institutions—from telephone service to a functioning post office to working courts—that make government work elsewhere. Only six of Afghanistan's 364 districts have received services as part of the pilot phase; the program is expected to expand to 150 districts by the end of next year and to all districts within three years.

Will all this make a difference?

Not if the ASP ends up just being a series of construction projects. The hardest and most critical component, which will take many years to achieve, is finding and deploying skilled administrators, training them in new practices, and then providing them sufficient authority and resources so they can start delivering services. The Government of Afghanistan must focus its efforts on human, as well as physical, infrastructure, and it's not yet clear how the ASP will achieve this.

Afghanistan will never reach the level of centralization of Western states, and that's a good thing-a federalist model promoting greater regional autonomy is probably a better fit. Therefore, the key to a strong, stable national government in Afghanistan is a far-reaching, competent, and fair network of local government officials. On that effort, the Afghan Stabilisation Programme is a good start, but there is much to be achieved.

Carl Robichaud is a program officer at The Century Foundation. This article originally appeared in Afghanistan Watch.