The Best

Violence in Iraq down. Regardless of one’s views on the wisdom of the U.S. troop surge, the causes for the current downturn in violence or its near-term sustainability, the fact that U.S. troops and the long-suffering Iraqis are experiencing a significant decrease in violence is a welcome development. The situation though is far from peaceful as Iraq remains incredibly dangerous and volatile and only appears to be normalizing when compared to the savage period of sectarian violence that followed the destruction of the al-‘Askariyah shrine in February 2006. It is also true that the concentration of forces in Baghdad and the rise of tribal councils in al-Anbar province have forced the violence into more susceptible areas. All that being said, and leaving aside criticism of the current Iraqi political paralysis (see below), the fact, in and of itself, that many fewer people are dying is a positive one.

Lebanese factions eschew violence. The continuing Lebanese political crisis over the inability to broker a parliamentary compromise in selecting a president and the string of assassinations of anti-Syrian political figures have resuscitated fears of a return to the sectarian violence that has marked recent Lebanese history. However, while tensions between the March 14th movement and the Hezbollah/Aoun opposition remain, Lebanon for the most part has remained calm in the face of the country’s political paralysis. Paradoxically, any recent spasms of violence appear to have focused the minds of national political leaders on the potentially disastrous course that events could easily take and have forced a return to the protracted and messy negotiation process.

Egyptian blogs expose torture tapes. The International Center for Journalists awarded the Egyptian blogger and activist, Wael Abbas, with a 2007 Knight International Journalism Award, marking the first time that a blogger had received the honor. Abbas, who has been arrested and beaten for his activities, is the most recognized figure among a group of Egyptian bloggers who have focused international attention on the routine use of torture by the Egyptian police and security services. Abbas has been in the lead in leaking video recordings of torture that have included the sodomizing of a minibus driver with a stick and the painful trussing and hanging of a woman on a pole placed between two chairs. These recordings displayed a petty and senseless savagery that shocked viewers and exposed how torture has infected all levels of the Egyptian security services.

Admiral Fallon goes on al-Jazeera. In September 2007, Admiral William Fallon, the chief of the Central Command (CentCom), did an extended interview with the popular Arabic language satellite channel, al-Jazeera. During the interview, Fallon took issue with Washington’s feverish rhetoric on Iran, some of it emanating from the Bush administration itself: “This constant drumbeat of conflict is what strikes me, which is not helpful and not useful,” and added that he “expect[s] that there will be no war and that is what we ought to be working for.” The appearance was relatively unique given the general reluctance on the part of senior U.S. officials to appear on al-Jazeera due to concerns regarding the network’s perceived anti-American biases. Accordingly, interaction with al-Jazeera has been limited, often depriving U.S. public diplomacy efforts of a major platform in the Arab world. In contrast, Fallon’s appearance on al-Jazeera sought to articulate U.S. policy in a popular Arab forum and created a positive stir in the Arab world; but it also highlighted the limits of U.S. public diplomacy when trying to advance or defend other U.S. policies in the region—no amount of polish and spin can compensate for rash and unwise choices on the ground.

Major jihadist leader revisits the religious justifications for jihad. In November 2007, Sayid Imam, a founder, chief ideologue and first emir of al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad), an Islamist group responsible for much of the violence that plagued Egypt in the 1990s, published a landmark treatise that renounced the more extreme doctrines on jihad and limited the jurisprudential justifications upon which such actions could be undertaken. “Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World” was serialized in the Egyptian newspaper al-Masry al-Youm over fifteen days and specifically targeted the promiscuous use of jihad to sanctify the killing of civilians, Shi’a, and non-Muslims and the frequent resort to takfir to declare other Muslims as unbelievers, concepts that were hugely influential in the ideological formation of al-Qaeda. The revisions offered by Imam, a former colleague of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri, have been rejected by al-Qaeda and other militant salafi jihadists who have cast doubt on the sincerity of a work composed while the author serves a life term of imprisonment in Egypt. None of the proceeding should, however, lead to any confusion as to Imam’s orientation as he is still a committed salafi jihadist whose views are anathema to this author and would shock many readers. Further, as Khalil el-Anani has pointed out, “[i]t would be extremely naive to expect such revisions to have a substantial effect on Al-Qaeda cells and their followers.” However, this sort of internal development could presage a more robust debate within the ranks of extremists on the permissibility of the most pernicious tactics and could also embolden other critics to speak out more vociferously.

The United States abandons seven years of Arab-Israeli laissez-faire. The Annapolis Middle East peace conference and its aftermath have been justly criticized for failing to improve conditions on the ground and advance negotiations on final status issues. However, the direct engagement of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict serves as a repudiation of the previous policy of disengagement and neglect. Contrary to the dogma that held sway during the first seven years of the Bush administration, U.S. engagement at Annapolis was based on a recognition of the centrality of the conflict in achieving U.S. interests in the Middle East and an understanding of the manner in which the Israeli occupation has fueled the growing anti-Americanism that marks the region.

Iran hawks’ wings clipped. The December 2007 release of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities blunted the bellicose rhetoric in Washington and undercut the efforts of Iran hawks to generate an atmosphere of impending crisis in regard to an Iranian nuclear weapons program. In addition to completely shifting the terms of reference with respect to the Iranian nuclear program and limiting the possibility of military action against Iran, the NIE created political and diplomatic space for a future U.S. administration to engage directly in comprehensive negotiations with Iran and address grievances against the Iranian regime, including support for terrorist organizations and the potential resumption of a nuclear weapons program, through rational diplomacy and the use of pressure and inducements.

The Worst

Iraqi political paralysis intensifies. The logic for undertaking a military surge was essentially political, predicated on an assumption that curbing violence would provide the Iraqis an opportunity to reach legislative compromises and establish the foundations for a sustainable national political arrangement. The inability of the Iraqi political class to reach some sort of grand bargain among the various political parties, sectarian groups, and militias cannot be understood as a failure of politics because the Iraqis themselves do not share the same assumptions and goals as their U.S. interlocutors. The various competing factions are concerned with amassing political power and attempting to consolidate their fragmented positions within their ethnic/sectarian bases, which are often tied to the ability to shape events through the use of the national army, the police, or militias. The United States will not be able to bring about a national political settlement as long as Iraqi leaders remain focused on intra-sectarian rivalries on one level and, on another level, conduct negotiations with an eye toward a potential full-scale civil war.

U.S. rhetoric on Iran shifts to Iraq. The focus of the administration’s challenge to Iran notably shifted during 2007 from the country’s nuclear program to Iranian actions in Iraq. The more strident rhetoric that accompanied this shift clouded understanding of the strategic calculations that are guiding Iranian actions in Iraq and threatened to escalate the struggle for control and influence between the United States and Iran that inevitably followed the removal of Saddam Hussein. The signs of this shift could be seen in the accusation that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Quds force was fueling the increased death toll among U.S. forces in Iraq through its support and training of Shi’a militia, the introduction of the “explosively formed penetrator” to the terms of the debate regarding Iranian intentions in Iraq, and the aggressive detention of Iranian officials in Iraq. The culmination of these increased tensions was the Senate’s September 2007 passage of the Kyl-Lieberman resolution, which called for the designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization and potentially established an alternative approach to militarily confronting Iran. But as Milt Bearden has noted, “[i]t is delusional to suggest that Iran would remain a spectator to a foreign invasion” on its borders. The fact that Iraqi intentions have long dominated the strategic considerations of Iran meant that Tehran would have an obvious strategic interest in supporting and cultivating pro-Iranian Shi’a political parties and militias. This is particularly so in light of the history of U.S. rhetoric singling out Iran as a member of the “axis of evil” and intimating that use of force could be an option for achieving regime change in Tehran. While stabilizing Iraq is clearly a long-term Iranian interest, it would not come as a shock if Iran’s Iraqi proxies and sympathizers have engaged in violent actions against coalition forces in Iraq when Iran has a clear vested interest in making the U.S. occupation a costly one. However, even if that assumption is accepted, Iranian actions in Iraq were never a main cause of the violence, which was largely driven by sectarian killings and the anti-American insurgency. This willful exaggeration of the Iranian role in Iraq throughout 2007 threatened to tilt the U.S. into a full-scale war that would have imperiled U.S. forces in Iraq and jeopardized broader policy goals throughout the Middle East.

Osama and Ayman keep thumbing their noses. On December 17, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahri released a taped interview in which he praised the jihad in Iraq, mocked the British “escape” from Basra, and denounced the September 2007 testimony of General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker as failed propaganda. This latest release followed similar recent propaganda efforts by Zawahri and Osama bin Laden, who appeared in a video for the first time in over three years in September 2007 and recently released several audio recordings. These widely disseminated remarks are an intermittent reminder of the administration’s failure to apprehend the chief plotters of 9/11, commit the necessary resources to stabilize Afghanistan, and adequately address the gathering threat posed by al-Qaeda and its sympathizers. A National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat facing the United States released in July 2007 indicated that al-Qaeda’s “central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities.” Ominously, the NIE went on to assess that “the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability.”

Airpower contra-indicated for counterinsurgency. The appointment of General David Petraeus as the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq marked a long overdue shift in military tactics and strategy. However, the increasing reliance on airpower to compensate for inadequate troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that the principles of counterinsurgency warfare have not yet been fully incorporated in the decision-making of field commanders in Iraq and have not been implemented as part of a coherent military strategy in Afghanistan. Anthony H. Cordesman has noted that data on the use of major munitions in air strikes in both Iraq and Afghanistan from 2004 to 2007 and, in particular from 2006 to 2007, “reflect a dramatic increase in both the use of airpower and the intensity of combat.” The increased reliance on airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in excessive civilian casualties and undermined the political objectives of military planners. In Afghanistan in particular, the heavy toll of aerial bombardment exacerbated tensions between the United States and its NATO allies, contributed to the Taliban’s highly effective propaganda efforts, fueled local resentments against multinational forces, and eroded confidence in the Karzai government. The resort to airpower also highlights the distorting effects of the Iraq war on the continuing military efforts in Afghanistan. Perhaps most importantly, the reliance on airpower is a further reminder of the disastrous ramifications of the flawed strategic calculus that justified the U.S. invasion and occupation of a major Arab state. In a related and troubling development, the U.S. Air Force responded to the December 2006 publication of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual by introducing its own doctrine on counterinsurgency in August 2007, which ignored the general unsuitability of airpower in counterinsurgency operations and enshrined the problematic approach to irregular warfare that has been so spectacularly counterproductive in 2007.

Hamas and Fatah fracture Palestine. The outbreak of widespread armed conflict between Hamas and Fatah and the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007 were welcomed by many observers who viewed the events through the Manichean lens of the “War on Terror” and saw the division of the Palestinian territories as a clarifying moment. This shortsighted view failed to grasp the degraded legitimacy of Fatah, the core support for Hamas among a significant minority of Palestinians, and the ability of Hamas to disrupt negotiations if it is threatened by the course of the negotiations process. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a durable and credible negotiated settlement that will necessarily entail painful compromises could be achieved based on the exclusion of the 1.3 million Palestinians of Gaza. Additionally, the ongoing blockade of Gaza and the deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation tarnish the legitimacy of Fatah, which is seen as an active participant in the aggressive isolation of Hamas, and undermine the long-term sustainability of any negotiated peace agreement.

Interim measures bedevil the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation process. While confidence-building measures and incrementalism have long haunted the progress of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the Annapolis conference was designed to overcome the lack of mutual trust by launching final status talks parallel to efforts to resolve interim issues. However, the dynamics of a drawn-out public negotiation process ensure that the lack of confidence between the parties resulting from the failure to implement interim measures, whether for practical or political reasons, will inevitably poison the atmosphere of final status negotiations. Most notable recently has been the Israeli penchant for announcing controversial new settlement projects prior to scheduled negotiations, as occurred before the Annapolis conference and the inaugural December 12 meeting between the parties. If these settlement projects are approved and completed, they will detrimentally affect the contiguity and feasibility of a future Palestinian state, particularly the E-1 area between Jerusalem and Ma’aleh Adumim, which would divide the West Bank in two and segregate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. Even if these announcements are only intended to mollify domestic political pressures and do not result in new settlement activity, they will have had the immediate effect of undercutting Palestinian negotiators and bolstering those among Hamas who have depicted the negotiations as an Israeli attempt to deflect international pressure and criticism. As Ahmed Qurei, the lead Palestinian negotiator, has stated, “[i]t is a question of us having credibility or no credibility.”

Michael Wahid Hanna is a Program Officer at The Century Foundation.