In the weeks preceding Afghanistan's presidential elections on October 12, dire predictions punctuated the news. Journalists observed that registration in some areas exceeded population by 40 percent, reported cases of vote buying and intimidation, and predicted election-day violence. After all, the Taliban had vowed to launch massive and coordinated attacks, and the international presence was spread thin. Many observers braced themselves for an electoral disaster.

And yet when election day came to a close, the worst concerns had not been borne out. Eight million Afghans had turned out to the polls, many waiting hours to cast their ballots. The day was largely free of violence. Yes, there were allegations of fraud and intimidation, as well as the much publicized ink snafu, and opposition candidates were calling for a re-vote even before the sun had set. But it soon became clear that the Taliban had failed to disrupt the elections, and that the predictions of massive vote fraud had been dispelled (while some fraud occurred at the margins, it was made moot by the scale of Karzai's victory.) Afghanistan had weathered the test of its first election, and President Karzai emerged with a decisive victory that bolstered his legitimacy, and that of the Afghan government.

So will the dire predictions about Iraqi elections that are issuing from virtually every non-official source prove to be equally off-the-mark? The Afghan model might seem to suggest that things will be better than anticipated—but don't wager on a successful outcome.

As difficult a logistic challenge as the Afghan election posed, Sunday's voting presents a challenge of a different magnitude. In Afghanistan, Taliban insurgents hovered at the fringes; in Iraq, they are a constant presence, with redoubts in the core cities. In Afghanistan, people wondered if insurgents could make good on its promises; in Iraq, people know they can. While actually disrupting the vote on election day would require great logistical precision, perhaps beyond the capacity of Iraq's well-coordinated insurgents, the threat of post-election retaliation could lead many voters in the Sunni triangle to stay home on Sunday.

Second, Afghanistan had the patience to time its elections better. Remember that the international community—wisely, as it turned out—twice delayed Afghan elections, and decided to split the vote, holding the complicated and contentious parliamentary elections six months after the more straightforward presidential vote. In contrast, the U.S. has rebuffed the pleas of Iraqi authorities to delay elections. As a result, Iraqis will go to the polls on Sunday with an insufficient voting infrastructure, too few security personnel, and no international observers. Many Sunnis will likely boycott the vote or stay home to avoid violence, a scenario that would result in a volatile preponderance of power in the hands of Shiites, who comprise 60% of the population but may end up with a greater share of seats in the legislative body that will write the Iraqi constitution and determine the role of minority voices in the state.

Third, Sunday's election in Iraqi is far more complicated than the Afghan election poll, which simply required voters to identify the name (or picture) of one candidate from a list of eighteen. On Sunday, Iraqi voters will face what Britain's Telegraph terms "the mother of all ballots," with a choice of "257 parties and individuals, 111 of them competing for the national elections, the rest for a score of different regional and local assembly votes." Compounding the confusion is the fact that many of the slates have similar names or symbols, making it hard to tell them apart. Each ballot sheet will be huge (3 feet long by 2 feet wide), and each voter will receive either one or two (depending on the region); they then must find their choice, and mark at most one box on each sheet.

Violence has had two additional consequences: the United States will keep the location of some polling sites a secret until the last minute and the Iraqi election commission will allow slates to keep their member's identities hidden. As a result, many voters will not know where to cast their ballot, and 7,000 candidates on the national election remain nameless and faceless. The system seems almost designed to create confusion. (for more details, see Tova Wang's "Democracy for Iraq?")

Fourth is the difference in monitoring procedures in the two countries. When opposition candidates challenged the results of the Afghan election, impartial experts were on hand to evaluate their claims. As reporter Robin Wright notes, "When 8 million Afghans voted in October, at least 122 international observers from across Europe and Asia monitored the presidential election -- and declared it an 'orderly and transparent process.'" On the other hand, "there will be no neutral outside group deployed across Iraq to determine whether voters are impeded, ballot boxes are stuffed, any party tries to interfere with the process or votes are counted fairly." How will challenges be dealt with when they inevitably arise?

The differences between these two elections reflect a broader set of differences between [how the United States has approached reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan . The Afghan elections, which were crafted with robust United Nations involvement, were seen less as the result of U.S. mandated rules, and more as the product of a participatory process. Local authorities had more input into structure and timeline, and consequently greater ownership of the result.

Most significantly, Afghans and internationals agreed that elections should be postponed to allow for more thorough preparation and better polling conditions. There are many cases in which free and fair elections can help consolidate legitimate authority and transform military struggle into political struggle. But there are also cases when unfree and unfair elections heighten antagonism—precisely what could happen if Sunday's elections endow Shiites with a preponderance of power.

President Bush made a strong case for democratization last week. What is becoming increasingly clear is how much the U.S. and the international community did to advance liberty through Afghanistan's elections, and how few of those lessons have been applied to Iraq.

Carl Robichaud is a program officer at The Century Foundation.