Let's table the chaotic situation in Iraq for a moment and consider what Bush's re-election means for Afghanistan.

Security. The Bush administration's priority for the U.S. military in Afghanistan has always been hunting down Al Qaeda and the Taliban insurgents. While the U.S. did temporarily deploy several hundred troops to help NATO provide security for the October presidential election, and it does deploy a tiny percentage of its force to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the U.S. Army does not participate in the NATO-led ISAF peacekeeping force, which remains woefully undermanned. With pressure to bring troops home and to slow down the Army's operational tempo, Bush will reduce, not expand, the number of US soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan, even as security conditions threaten to deteriorate. This desire to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan when our allies are digging in for a longer haul threatens the country's prospects for peace and prosperity.

Reconstruction. Neither the U.S. nor most of its allies has fulfilled its pledges of reconstruction aid. Of the almost $12 billion the US spent in Afghanistan in the 2003 supplemental appropriation, more than $11 billion is authorized for military activities; what's left over goes to reconstruction and development. Given Bush's track record on meeting his pledges to the Afghans, it is not likely that spending will increase, despite Karzai's pleas for a greater American investment.

Dealing with opium. The U.S. acknowledges that opium production endangers democratic progress and stability in Afghanistan, but has thus far tried to avoid entanglements in fighting the drug trade. This week, however, the Washington Post reported that the administration will ask Congress for permission to re-purpose $700 million to help with poppy eradication in Afghanistan. While this move falls short of engaging U.S. soldiers to destroy poppy fields and only appears to allocate $100 million for the critical crop replacement component to help Afghan farmers, this request is at least philosophically a step in the right direction. (For new developments in the drug trade, including an analysis of the UN's annual opium report—released yesterday—see Afghanistan's Latest Drug Report: The Hidden Story.)

U.S. engagement will remain high. The Bush campaign has presented Afghanistan as the most successful episode in the longer narrative of the president's global war on terror—and they won't want to see the project fail and spoil his legacy. The Administration has a loyal friend in Hamid Karzai and a strong envoy in Afghan-American Zalmay Khalilzad, which means it will continue to care. Khalilzad is important to all this: he has Bush's ear and can ensure that the president stays engaged on the non-military aspects of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. However, the U.S. must proceed with caution here. There were persistent concerns during the Afghan presidential campaign that Khalilzad was too heavy a presence in local politics. Karzai's rivals cried foul when the then-interim president was shuttled around in American military helicopters and made announcements of major U.S. aid projects on the eve of the election. While Afghans appear to accept Karzai as a legitimate head of state, the Americans must be mindful to keep their distance or they risk fanning criticism that Karzai is their puppet.

Along these lines, the urgency the Bush administration has put on Afghan democratization means that they will push hard for parliamentary elections to happen as scheduled this spring. Again, they need to approach that with caution: parliamentary elections are fundamentally more complicated than those for the presidency, and the administration needs to be willing to accept a delay if it becomes necessary.

Coalition not likely to change. Afghanistan is the one spot in the global war on terror where the Western alliance is supposed to be intact, but engagement is nevertheless fairly shallow. NATO's contribution to ISAF is valuable but insufficient, and the EU and its members are behind on their reconstruction pledges. In short, our allies could be doing much more in Afghanistan, and reasonable U.S. leadership could negotiate a greater contribution from them. It's impossible to know if this would have changed under a President Kerry, but there is little indication that it will improve during the second Bush term.

Jeremy Barnicle is a program officer at The Century Foundation.