Afghan President Hamid Karzai's request to President Bush this week for greater control over American troops in his country cuts to several central questions: what foreign presence is appropriate in Afghanistan? Who should run these foreign troops, and to whom should they remain accountable? Are they there to preserve Afghan security and fight terrorism, or for other purposes as well?

Karzai is not the first to voice skepticism about the U.S. military's long-term role in the region. To many allies and competitors, the U.S. force posture seems incongruent with the threat. In Afghanistan alone, the Pentagon leads a coalition of 18,000 troops (16,700 of them American), ostensibly to combat a dwindling Taliban insurgency of perhaps a thousand militants. The mandate of these troops is to combat al Qaeda and the Taliban; they do not play a role in counternarcotics operations, and are only peripherally involved in providing security for Afghan citizens. Rather than decreasing in size in the four years since the defeat of the Taliban, coalition forces almost doubled in the past year from a low of 10,000.

So far, U.S. troops have played a constructive role for Afghanistan. They deposed the Taliban's harsh rule and restored stability to a country that had seen a generation of war. Alongside NATO forces and NGO partners, they helped to preserve and extend governmental authority, and paved the way for elections. October's election was essentially a referendum on Karzai's rule, and voters felt that he provided stability and opportunity, in large part because of his relationship with Washington.

A little over a year ago, attitudes towards American and the U.S. military were generally favorable. The most comprehensive survey, conducted by the Asia Foundation from February to March 2004, found that roughly two-thirds of Afghans were positive toward both the U.S. and U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan. However, the survey gave rise to concerns: a plurality of Afghans were unfavorable to the U.S. in both the Northwest (58 percent unfavorable vs. 30 percent favorable) and the South (46 percent unfavorable vs. 37 percent favorable). Attitudes toward the U.S. military were similar (59 percent unfavorable vs. 26 percent favorable in the Northwest, 42 percent unfavorable vs 39 percent favorable in the South.) (see pp. 9-10)

Moreover, there is evidence that Afghans are chafing at the thought of a long-term American 'occupation.' As General Richard Meyers and President Karzai both argued last week, the violent protests on May 11 were less the result of a single incident (the Koran desecration) than of broader frustrations about America's role. Numerous complaints broadcast in the Afghan media—ranging from imperious behavior by U.S. security contractors, to abuses during raids, to claims that former U.S Ambassador to Afghanistan Khalilzad was the real head of state—suggest that the Afghan public is growing weary of Washington's hand. The presence of American troops, which were ramped up to ensure the success of the coming parliamentary elections, could have the opposite effect, spurring a political backlash that strengthens the position of unsavory factions.

In addition, this troop presence may be fueling anti-Americanism in the region. Operation Enduring Freedom, originally viewed positively by much of the world, has been re-cast in the wake of America's invasion and occupation of Iraq, and is seen by much of the world as part of a U.S. grand strategy of hegemony. A March 2004 Pew poll found that by a wide margin people in the Muslim countries surveyed (Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, and Morocco) oppose America's war on terrorism. The 2005 Pew polling data indicate that respondents question the sincerity of America's motives in the war on terror—especially in Pakistan where only 6 percent felt U.S. efforts were sincere (vs. 58 percent insincere.) A majority of respondents in many nations worried that the U.S. military posed a threat to their country. The net result is suspicion of U.S. intentions and an erosion of America's position in the region.

The U.S. can assuage some of these fears by working to internationalize the security presence in Afghanistan. The Pentagon long opposed the expansion of U.N.-authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces, resulting in a small force of 5,000 limited to Kabul. The mandate of this force, which consists of NATO troops, was recently expanded to the provinces, and has played a role in securing elections and reconstruction. These international forces should be bolstered to guarantee stability until the Afghan army reaches sufficiency (and until its loyalty to the state, rather than to individual factions, is confirmed.) The international force should be increasingly constituted by Muslims, such as the Turkish troops that serve there with distinction today (to bring in more troops from mostly-Muslim states, ISAF will eventually need to involve non-NATO partners.) An expanded ISAF, authorized by the U.N., could eventually supplant the American forces. This force would have the benefit of being multi-national, multi-religious, and internationally accountable.

It will be interesting to see how such a proposal is greeted by Washington, which has not pressed for increases in international troops in Afghanistan as energetically as it has in Iraq. A sizeable and indefinite base presence in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan allows the U.S. to project power toward China and Russia. Moreover, in the President's transformative vision for the greater Middle East, American troops help ensure a loyal, democratic, and thriving Afghanistan that can induce reform within Iran and Pakistan. Of course the question remains: does this presence serve as a stimulant for democratic and societal reform or as an irritant that can incite hostility and help recruit radicals?

Another troubling implication of the over-militarized approach to America's regional goals is that military expenses have crowded out critical state-building investments. America efforts in Afghanistan follow the meringue model of nation-building, with a substantial military crust concealing a broad but airy layer of societal engagement. America sponsors numerous reconstruction initiatives, but many of them lack substance and funding. If budgets reveal priorities, the administration's 2005 supplemental request is illuminating: in a vast request for $82 billion, only $2 billion was set aside for non-military aid to Afghanistan. Military operations in Afghanistan, on the other hand, are estimated at $13 billion per year.

It's sad to say that America's anemic levels of assistance are not unique among donors, which pledged last year to provide $8.2 billion in aid over three years, a far cry from the World Bank and Afghan government's estimate that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion over seven years. What is unique is the military presence that accompanies these aid gestures. The U.S. should work to share the military burden, and then re-invest the savings into measures critical to long-term success: confronting the drug problem, cracking down on smuggling, and expanding government capacity. Afghanistan remains abjectly poor and ranks among the worst-off in nearly every development indicator, including education, women's health, life expectancy, infant mortality, and infectious disease. Even with recent economic and educational progress Afghanistan could still fail.

It's important not to downplay the good that America has done in Afghanistan. U.S. dollars have contributed to the construction of over 200 schools, the immunization against measles and polio of 4 million children, and the rehabilitation of Afghanistan's lifeline—the critical Kabul-Kandahar highway. With U.S. support, Karzai has gradually expanded the reach of the central government toward the lawless periphery. But America has neither done as much as it could, nor as much as it has promised. Afghan expectations are unrealistically high, and the situation remains precarious: a recipe for instability.

Karzai yielded this week in accepting a continued U.S. presence without Afghan or international oversight. But the negative repercussions of an indefinite U.S. military presence are only likely to grow, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Carl Robichaud is a program officer at The Century Foundation.