September 29, 2005

This Week in Afghanistan Watch:

• Ali Jalali, Interior Minister, Resigns in Frustration
  
• Afghan Military: Training Too Slow-and Target Too High?
  
• Assassination Clause Claims First Victim?
  
• Featured Article: Where Does the Aid Money Go?
  
• Senlis Council: Afghanistan Has Brief Window on Opium
  
• Pakistan's "Janus-faced" Counterterrorism
  
• First Results Trickle In--But what do they Signify?

"I didn't know any of them . . . But people told me, 'For the sake of God, put a check somewhere!' so I chose one man and one woman. I don't know their names, but I liked their pictures."
—Esmatullah Lalzada, 65, who voted using the seven-page Kabul province ballot (U.S. News)

"It is obvious that right now our currency is being propped up by foreign aid and drug money . . . But one will end, and one we're fighting to end."
—Noorullah Delawari, governor, Afghanistan Central Bank

"I think there is one window of opportunity and this window will be closed in a year or so."
—Emmanuel Reinert, executive director of the Paris-based The Senlis Council

Top Stories

Afghan Interior Minister Quits After Complaining of Graft
Afghanistan will miss Jalali, a principled and honest leader who has done his best with a daunting portfolio. Jalali fought, unsuccessfully, to keep militant commanders out of the government and to staunch the flow of opium-related corruption. He seems to have finally lost his patience with Karzai's non-confrontational style—which is perhaps both his greatest asset and greatest liability.

KABUL, Sept 27 (Washington Post) by N.C. Aizenman—The top crime-fighting official in President Hamid Karzai's cabinet announced his resignation Tuesday after complaining publicly for months about corruption in the government. Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali, 63, a former journalist, said in an interview with Tolo television that he was stepping down to pursue a career in academia.

Close friends of Jalali, however, said he had expressed frustration with Karzai's decisions to keep powerful factional leaders, including some linked to Afghanistan's burgeoning drug trade, in appointive government posts . . . Jalali, the former interior minister, was widely considered a committed leader in the government's effort to pacify the country, which has been racked by increased political violence since last spring. He was first appointed in January 2003, then renamed to a cabinet that had been largely purged of warlords and was dominated by Western-oriented technocrats after Karzai's electoral victory in October.

Aides to Karzai denied any rift between the two men, who are related by marriage. "Jalali has had the full confidence of the president," said Khaleeq Ahmad, a presidential spokesman. "He has done an excellent job. . . . He was probably one of the closest advisers to the president." However, in the television interview aired Tuesday, Jalali hinted that his power to fire governors and provincial police officials had sometimes been curtailed. In general, he said, "the Interior Ministry would recommend people and the president would approve them. But sometimes, for political reasons, the decision on which governor to appoint was made by the national security council."

Among the moves that Jalali privately decried, a close friend and former colleague said, was the transfer of Gul Agha Shirzai, a controversial former militia leader, from one governorship to another.

"He was not happy with the president's interference in his work," the friend said.

During news conferences, Jalali had hinted he might make public the names of government officials implicated in Afghanistan's opium trade, which now accounts for nearly 90 percent of the world's heroin supply.

Reuters reports that Jalali "has been at odds with Karzai over the president's appointments to important provincial posts because of concerns they would pursue factional interests. Jalali has also openly complained that some officials are involved in Afghanistan's massive narcotics trade, which analysts describe as the biggest obstacle to long-term security."

Election campaigning in Mazar, Afghanistan. © Sultan Massoodi/IRIN

Building an Afghan Army and Learning a Lesson in Patience
Eric Schmitt's article is an excellent assessment of the technical progress in the effort to develop an Afghan National Army. But the real question is not why there are so few Afghan forces after four years of training, but why there are so many. The model for the new Afghan forces envisions a professional, highly trained force of 70,000—a much larger and better paid army than what Afghanistan can sustainably afford. A force this large makes Afghanistan dependent on U.S. military aid for the foreseeable future. The U.S. has spent "$2.5 billion in the past two years on training, equipping and paying Afghan security forces," but don't expect this investment to continue indefinitely. And armed men, however professionally they are trained, only provide security so long as they are drawing a paycheck.

As international donors begin to negotiate the next successor agreement to the Bonn accord, they should examine Afghanistan's security needs and adopt a more sustainable military model.

JALALABAD, Sept 25 (New York Times) by Eric Schmitt—American and international efforts to train Afghanistan's security forces began in 2002, about a year before a similar program for Iraqi soldiers and police officers. Yet the Afghan model seems to have lagged behind the troubled Iraqi program.

The reasons—like having to rebuild the Afghan Army from scratch and differing allied priorities related to developing a national Afghan police corps—say much about the very different circumstances each program has confronted, as well as how American trainers in both countries are trying to learn from one another's mistakes and successes, senior Army commanders said . . .

Worries about persistent problems with logistics and other support for Afghan Army units in the field recently prompted General Eikenberry to slow the creation of new battalions, from about two a month to one. "One of the main vulnerabilities of the Afghan national army is their logistics system," said Maj. Gen. Jason K. Kamiya, the American commander of daily tactical operations here . . .

Another program to have American military trainers live with and work alongside Afghan soldiers is more developed here than a similar one in Iraq. About 650 American military advisers now live and train with Afghan Army units. About three times that number of advisers are in Iraqi units, but the program did not become widespread in Iraq until a retired four-star Army general recommended it earlier this year to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

Of greater concern to the Americans are the police forces, which suffer shortages of vehicles, radios and even basic weapons. Until early September, many police recruits were training with wooden rifles. "It's more or less a hollow force," said Maj. Gen. John T. Brennan of the Air Force, who oversees the police development effort. He said that the United States would spend $860 million this year to train and equip the police but that it would not be until late 2009 that the force was fully trained. . . . Over all, the United States has spent more than $2.5 billion in the past two years on training, equipping and paying Afghan security forces.

Afghan parliamentary candidate shot dead in north
Before the elections, many observers commented on the so-called "assassination clause"—an election law that says if a winning candidate dies, his seat passes to the next highest vote getter. Who the heck wrote that clause?

MAZAR-I-SHARIF, Afghanistan, Sept 27 (Reuters)—A candidate for a parliamentary seat in Afghanistan's legislative elections was shot dead along with one of his bodyguards in northern Afghanistan on Tuesday, police said.

National assembly candidate Mohammad Ashraf Ramazan was driving through the city of Mazar-i-Sharif when his car was attacked by unknown gunmen, police spokesman Sher Jan said. Ramazan was the first candidate killed since the Sept. 18 elections, which Taliban guerrillas vowed but failed to disrupt. According to election commission figures, with 12 percent of the vote counted, Ramazan had been running in fifth place for one of 11 assembly seats in Balkh province, of which Mazar is the capital.

Featured Article

A Work in Progress
An excellent glimpse at some of the inefficiencies, and undesired repercussions, of the international approach to giving aid.

Sept 25 (U.S. News) by Bay Fang—Coordinating all the foreign aid projects has proven difficult--another source of Afghans' frustration. "There's a lack of a coherent approach from the international community," says a senior western adviser to the Karzai government. "There's overlapping structure after structure, and the ministers who speak the best English get the most money." Part of the problem is the division of authority among the donors that was laid out in the agreement signed by the various Afghan factions four years ago. The document laid out timetables and processes for developing a sovereign Afghanistan, but it was hardly a road map. Italy, for example, was supposed to take the lead in creating a new legal system but had only $6 million for the effort. Washington, by contrast, is spending $800 million for a new police force. Since the justice system affects so many other sectors of Afghan life, other donor countries have begun putting money into their own justice projects—without consulting with each other. The result, predictably enough, has been chaotic.

That same confusion exists between the Afghan government and the donors. Abdul Sitar Murad is the governor of Kapisa province. "Sometimes I see bridges being built, and I will stop and say, 'Who are you?' " he says. "They say, 'I am from USAID.' Sometimes it annoys me; sometimes I'm just astonished. I'm the governor, but I don't know what's going on."

Not surprisingly, many here believe much of the foreign aid money is being wasted. "The average cost of building a road in Afghanistan is half a million dollars per kilometer," says a senior diplomat in Kabul. "You start out with a certain amount, and by the time the contractor pays a consultant $1,000 a day to write a project report, pays for security and offices and cars, then subcontracts it out to an NGO, only about 20 percent goes into the project itself."

More News

Afghanistan has brief chance to turn opium from heroin to medicine
Afghanistan only has a small window of opportunity to divert its billion-dollar production of opium away from heroin and towards the manufacture of legal painkillers, the head of a drugs think-tank says. But the fragile country needs to act fast, with drugs cartels poised to take root, Emmanuel Reinert, executive director of the Paris-based The Senlis Council, told AFP on Sunday.

KABUL, Sept 25 (AFP)—"I think there is one window of opportunity and this window will be closed in a year or so," he said.

The group will on Monday present the findings of a study into legalizing Afghanistan's opium production and using it to make medicine at a conference in Kabul expected to draw government and farmers' representatives among other groups . . . Reinert admitted however that the Afghanistan government was cautious. This was because it did not want to alienate the international donors on which the country relies, with Britain yet to endorse the idea, he said . . .

"There is an incredible shortage of morphine and coedine in a number of countries, including neigbouring countries, and so you have a huge possibility and I think a number of countries are starting to see that," he said. According to the International Narcotics Control Board, six of the world's richest countries consume 80 percent of the world's morphine and coedine, which are also made from opium, while 80 percent of the world has access to only six percent.

"There is obviously an incredibly large amount of unmet need for painkillers, for treatment of cancer, HIV/ AIDS treatment," Reinert said. "Millions of people in Latin America, in Africa, in Russia, in China are dying in pain because they don't have access to these medicines and because the system is overregulated right now."

In response to the Senlis proposal, Reuters reports that Counter Narcotics Minister Habibullah Qaderi was glad Senlis did the study, but it was too early to consider. "As far as the licensing at this moment is concerned, I am saying no," he said. "I'm not in favor because it jeopardizes the whole of our effort . . . There would be anarchy in this country now. It would create a lot of problems." The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has also rejected the Senlis Council proposal, "saying it risked creating confusion among farmers and raising false expectations." Senlis claims there is only a brief window of opportunity, suggesting an implementation timeline that will likely strike donors and agencies as too aggressive.

Janus-faced counter-terrorism
Sept 21 (Asia Times) by Amir Mir—While Islamabad strongly denies Taliban and al-Qaeda infiltration into Afghanistan from the Pakistani side, the Karzai government insists that the infiltration is actually being orchestrated from the Pakistani border area.

Not long ago, it was the South Waziristan Tribal Agency that used to hog the media limelight on account of the military operation there against local and foreign militants. . . . The Pakistan army has now shifted the focus of its anti-terrorist operations from Wana in South Waziristan to Miranshah in North Waziristan. Despite official claims to have largely contained insurgents in the two tribal agencies, the North Waziristan area continues to pose a serious challenge, and has become a stronger base for al-Qaeda and Taliban militants on the run, due to presence of a large number of religious seminaries in the area and because an estimated 70% of the local population supports the jihadis . . .

With these details in mind, the Taliban resistance is expected to gain further strength until and unless the Pakistani establishment, which wants to keep the Taliban alive in the hope of using them to retrieve Islamabad's lost influence in Afghanistan, eventually decides otherwise.

First results trickle in from Afghanistan's landmark election
KABUL, Sep 25 (AFP)—Nearly a fifth of the ballots cast in Afghanistan's first parliamentary election for three decades have been counted, with the final results expected late next month, the election chief said…Erben said the election body, run by Afghan and UN officials, had also slightly raised its estimate for the turnout of the poll to 54 percent, or 6.8 million voters, after analysing nearly all the voting records….Political observers say the future parliament will be dominated by two blocks—the former commanders and representatives of Karzai's dominant Pashtun ethnic group—with a minority of independents and communists squeezing in.

'Taliban' storm Afghanistan jail
Sept 24 (BBC)—Taleban insurgents have stormed a prison and police HQ near the eastern Afghan city of Khost, leaving one inmate dead, Afghan officials say. . . . Provincial police chief, Mohammad Auyub, told the BBC some of the attackers spoke Arabic and Urdu. Afghanistan says Pakistan does not do enough to stop rebels crossing the border, an accusation Pakistan denies. The insurgents attacked with gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades. An arms depot inside the prison was blown up before the rebels fled across the border with Pakistan, Mr Auyub said.

The Message Of Lower Voter Turnout
Sept 25 (RFE/RL) by Amin Tarzi—Roughly half of Afghans exercised their democratic right by saying that they are not content with many of the people campaigning to represent them.

Afghanistan's Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) on 22 September officially announced that 53 percent of Afghanistan's voters cast their ballots in the parliamentary and provincial council elections on 18 September. Voter participation in Kabul was just 36 percent—lower than in many far-off provinces . . .

Lower participation by voters in the southern and eastern provinces of the country where neo-Taliban and other insurgencies are most active could be attributed to security concerns. But then why did around two-thirds of Kabul's voters, where security is relatively well-established, stay away from the polls?

The answer to the lower voter turnout must be found in other factors beyond security concerns.

Two broad issues seem to have led to the general voter malaise. First, voters were turned off by the presence on the list of candidates of former or current warlords and notorious human rights abusers—including known former communist and Taliban strongmen and people with little or no public recognition. The last point was made worst by the short campaign period which prevented the unknown candidates to reach out to voters. Second, as a 22-year-old Kabul resident told RFE/RL, many of the people's expectations following the presidential election remain largely unmet and this has led to a frustration which made people react differently to the 18 September elections compared to last year's presidential vote."

Before the 18 September elections, when confronted with the question that many people with very murky backgrounds were standing as candidates, Afghan President Hamid Karzai stated that the Afghans would choose the right candidates to represent them.

With the burden of Afghanistan's march to democracy placed squarely on the shoulders of the Afghan people, roughly half of them exercised their democratic right by saying that they are not content with many of the people campaigning to represent them in parliament or, perhaps, with the speed at which their country is progressing. If Afghanistan's democracy is to move forward in deeds and not just in words, this message by many Afghans must be heeded and steps taken to regain their confidence.

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Afghanistan Watch is prepared by Carl Robichaud, a program officer at The Century Foundation.

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