This Week in Afghanistan Watch:

• Feature article: Zalmay Khalilzad's Top Ten Reasons for Success in Afghanistan
  
• This week's news: Afghanistan condemns air strike deaths that kill 17 civilians, Search continues for SEAL, Central Asia coalition calls for U.S. withdrawal, Chinese imports surge
  
• Elections will proceed--but won't be perfect
  
• Washington Post Editorial: U.S. Must Pressure Pakistan and NATO

July 7, 2005

This Week's News:

Afghanistan Condemns Air Strike Deaths
KABUL, Jul 5 (AP) by Daniel Cooney: In a rare rebuff, Afghanistan's government sharply criticized the U.S. military Tuesday for killing up to 17 civilians in an air strike and ordered an immediate inquiry. The United States called it a "very unfortunate situation" and said it also would investigate.

The air strike in eastern Afghanistan targeted a known terrorist base, the United States said, but an Afghan government spokesman said the deaths of the civilians, including women and children, could not be justified….The reprimand also highlighted Afghan government concern that deadly mistakes could erode public support for the U.S. presence here….

U.S. forces, meanwhile, spent an eighth day scouring mountains in Kunar province bordering Pakistan, searching for the final member of an elite four-man Navy SEAL commando team that went missing June 28. One SEAL has been rescued, while the bodies of two others were recovered Monday....A transport helicopter sent in to rescue the four was shot down the day the team went missing, killing all 16 U.S. servicemen aboard.

U.S. forces described the house as "a known operating base for terrorist attacks ... as well as a base for a medium-level terrorist leader." But Jawed Ludin, Karzai's chief of staff, said "there is no way ... the killing of civilians can be justified." "The president is extremely saddened and disturbed," he said. "It's the terrorists we are fighting. It's not our people who should suffer."

UN: Afghan polls on track, but won't be perfect
KABUL, July 5 (Reuters) By David Brunnstrom - Parliamentary and provincial elections can be held throughout Afghanistan in September despite a difficult security environment, but they will not be perfect, the poll organizer said on Tuesday. U.N. official Peter Erben, the chief electoral officer for the Sept. 18 vote who has participated before in post-conflict elections in Bosnia, East Timor and Iraq, said Afghanistan was administratively the most challenging of them all.

In the polls, which the United Nations is helping organize, more than 11 million Afghans will chose from 6,000 candidates at 30,000 polling stations in a war-battered country with little infrastructure facing an increasingly violent Taliban insurgency.

"Six thousand candidates, 69 different ballots...a very, very challenging infrastructure in Afghanistan, a difficult security environment …I think it is extremely important we are realistic about the expectations for what elections can be held so shortly after a conflict and in a country that has the limitations of Afghanistan in terms of infrastructure and literacy and so forth," he said

Sofar, the problem has not been one of security - the Taliban operates in only a few provinces, and poll workers have been mostly spared from insurgent violence. Absent a major upsurge in violence, Erben confirmed that the U.N. will hold the election in all provinces.

What will the election accomplish? The likely outcome is that whichever officials are elected will either represent local strongmen or remain beholden to them. Ultimately Afghans will judge the election's legitimacy not by whether it was 'free and fair' but by whether the new officials and institutions serve their needs. Without an increased commitment by the international community to improve security and reduce crime in the provinces, the elections themselves are unlikely to change much.

A Hot Afghan Summer
July 6 (Washington Post): In its Wednesday editorial, the Post makes some sensible recommendations: pressure Musharraf and NATO to do more: "In all, the danger is growing that Afghanistan could begin to look more like Iraq, with an entrenched insurgency that seriously disrupts reconstruction and becomes a magnet for Islamic extremists. To prevent that, the Bush administration needs to bring more pressure to bear on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, a nominal ally who has pocketed billions in U.S. aid while allowing the Taliban to use Pakistan as a base for its Afghan operations. Afghan officials plausibly suspect that elements in Mr. Musharraf's army and government would like to see the coming elections disrupted. The administration must also continue to press its NATO allies to step up their deployments to Afghanistan, which currently amount to only 8,000 troops, compared with roughly 20,000 Americans."

Central Asia summit urges U.S. pullout
ASTANA, Kazakhstan, July 5 (AP) -- A regional alliance led by China and Russia has called for the U.S. and its coalition allies in Afghanistan to set a date for withdrawing from several states in Central Asia, reflecting growing unease at America's military presence in the region. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which groups Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, on Tuesday urged a deadline be set for withdrawal of the foreign forces from its member states in light of what it said was a decline in active fighting in Afghanistan. The alliance's move appeared to be an attempt to push the United States out of a region that Moscow regards as historically part of its sphere of influence and in which China seeks a dominant role because of its extensive energy resources.

The United States rejected the call for a deadline. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said the U.S. military presence "is determined by the terms of our bilateral agreements, under which both countries have concluded that there is a benefit to both sides from our activities."…According to the U.S military, Uzbekistan hosts at least 800 U.S. troops, while 1,200 U.S.-led troops are in Kyrgyzstan.

Arab boost for Afghan resistance
June 17, (Asia Times / RFE/RL) By Amin Tarzi and Kathleen Ridolfo: The sudden rise in attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan supports the theory that Arab militants in that country have regrouped in an effort to provide a reinvigorated Arab front against the United States, while the continuing insurgency in Iraq shows no signs of abatement, despite recent reports that Zarqawi may be near death as a result of a recent injury.

Afghanistan's Imports from China Surge 30 Percent in 2004
KABUL, July 5 (Asia Pulse): Chinese goods, accounting for a fourth of Afghanistan's total imports, have flooded local markets. Affordable prices are said to be a principal factor behind popular demand for these goods, whose import went up by 30 per cent last year. Mohammad Azim Wardak, director of foreign business at the Commerce Ministry, told Pajhwok Afghan News on Monday Sino-Afghan trade rose to US$500 million in 2004, compared to $383 million in 2003…

Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad responds to a reporter's question, Oct. 15, 2004. DoD photo by R. D. Ward. (Released)

Featured Article: How to Nation Build by Zalmay Khalilzad The National Interest 2005 SUMMER (subscription required) In this long article, the principal architect of America's policies in Afghanistan clearly outlines U.S. strategy and responds to a number of specific criticisms-including the elections timeline and U.S. relations with warlords. The article, only available to subscribers, is worth reading in its entirety. Below I summarize Khalilzad's ten specific lessons that help explain what has worked so far:" 1) The U.S. must understand "the aspirations or political center of gravity of a newly liberated society" 2) The U.S. must "position itself as an ally, not a conqueror or occupier, and to ensure that indigenous leaders take ownership of the new order."

Zal connects this to the election timeline (which meets its biggest test on September 18): "Many observers have been critical of the U.S. insistence that elections be held on a fast timeline. They argued that conditions were not yet right and that warlords and commanders still had too much influence to ensure a free and fair process. I took a different view. I believed that warlords and potential spoilers should be exposed as soon as possible to the popular will." "In this context, the loya jirgas and elections of the Bonn Process served a catalytic role. When confronted by the people at these key events, the potential spoilers almost visibly shrunk back, cognizant of their own political illegitimacy. Through each stage of the Bonn Process, the people have gained increasing confidence and the spoilers have steadily lost ground, creating a virtuous cycle…As a result, Americans have been seen as a catalyst for liberation, and as a positive and helpful force, not a predatory foreign power intent on ruling Afghanistan." 3) Strong diplomacy is needed with all players to "craft a national compact among competing groups" and "execute a mutually agreed strategy for reconstruction." Zal argues that "the United States has used its influence to help Afghan leaders agree on Afghan solutions to Afghan challenges. This has meant that the United States has needed to have relationships with all Afghan factions who accepted the political process--including those we felt might be potential spoilers…On sensitive issues, such as increasing ethnic balance in the government or curbing the influence of warlords, it has required living with ambiguity." 4) The U.S. military footprint must not be too large, lest it create "unnecessary friction" "A frequent criticism of the international community's military presence in Afghanistan has been that it was too small. Though partly valid early on, this point obscures another equally valid one: Too large a military presence can have unintended consequences, imperiling the overall mission.…the greater the presence of our military forces, the greater the danger that we will try to solve all of Afghanistan's problems ourselves and divert resources and focus from the main task: enabling the development of Afghan institutions and capabilities as rapidly as possible. " 5) Success depends on "reconstitution of a country's political elite…that has roots in the society and the vision and capability" On the attempt to transform warlords to legitimate political actors: "This was a difficult, contentious and sometimes risky process that combined assertion through the shadow effect of military power and negotiation by the national government, supported by the international community. Those who commanded private militias were persuaded to change their behavior if they wished to make the transition to the new era. At the same time, we made it clear that those who conduct themselves as warlords will not have a position of power and prestige in the new Afghanistan. The objective was to make the elites from the period of civil war into stakeholders in the new order, as well as to train and empower new elites." 6) "Effective communication is vital" Through routine media meetings and speeches, along with radio addresses, the U.S. was able to "explain--persistently and consistently--our vision and goals and why we are doing what we are doing in every main line of our activities…It is essential not just to talk with elites, but also to engage in a political dialogue with the entire nation we are trying to help." "The importance was evident with respect to the issue of disarming militias, which many Afghans told me was the top priority for ordinary civilians. This problem could not be solved overnight, particularly because we had to train a new army and police force to fill the vacuum if militias were to be disarmed. In my radio address on this subject, I explained the process that we were pursuing to negotiate disarmament and build new security forces." Zal says that Afghans appreciated this approach and were willing to be more patient. 7) The U.S. should use a "flexible, multilateral model" backed by a "robust" U.S. program "We have derived a great advantage from giving the UN the central role for organizing the international effort to help Afghanistan.…However, even in this structure there is no substitute for U.S. power and resources…there are certain outcomes--a strong national army, an effective police force and others--that the United States must at the end of the day be willing to deliver with its own efforts if necessary." 8) Engage neighboring countries "Our objective in Afghanistan is to create a political and geopolitical beachhead--a moderate and democratic state in a turbulent and unstable region. To succeed requires us to pursue a regional strategy that persuades and induces neighboring states to stand down from their policies of the past two decades. During this period, they organized and armed clients to fight for control over Afghanistan, seeking to dominate the country's strategic position." Khalilzad argues that "we must bring each regional power to the point where its leaders accept the fact that their interests are better served by a stable, independent and prosperous Afghanistan, an outcome that opens the way to a wider economic transformation of the region." A credible U.S. commitment is key: "If the leaders of these countries are uncertain about the strength of our commitment to stay the course, they are likely to hedge against the possibility that we will pull out…The challenge is finding ways to effectively signal our commitment, through both words and deeds, to leaders who are convinced of our short attention span." 9) Integration of the civil-military structure is essential "The military mission--defeating terrorists and insurgents--has been supported by the political process to build the legitimacy of the Afghan government and civilian-led programs such as police training. Efforts of civilian agencies--helping Afghans complete their democratic transition and reconstructing the economy, among others--have been supported by coalition military operations and progress toward establishing a national army. This experience should be a model for such efforts going forward, both in Afghanistan and other post-conflict situations." 10) The U.S. government must provide adequate resources and act efficiently "In 2002, all major players in Afghanistan--the UN, the United States and even the Afghan leadership--fundamentally underestimated the resource requirements for rebuilding the country. The United States, as well as other donors, adjusted their programs upward in 2003 and 2004…it will take annual assistance at that level or higher for five to seven years to achieve our goals." "Countries that engage in post-conflict reconstruction need to streamline their internal operations" in order to mobilize "before negative trends, such as the rise of organized crime, begin to take hold...If our often cumbersome contracting and other bureaucratic processes are too slow, we will find that the clock will run out, the people will become disillusioned..."

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Afghanistan Watch is prepared by Carl Robichaud, a program officer at The Century Foundation.

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